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Abstract
We consider a two-tier model of monetary policy where the central banker is both subject
to the explicit in1uence of elected political principals through contracts and the implicit in1u-
ence of interest groups willing to capture monetary policy. We analyze the impact of granting
independence to the central banker on the scope for capture and the agency costs of delegating
the monetary policy to a central banker. Political independence increases those agency costs but
signi!cantly stabilizes the politically induced 1uctuations of in1ation and improves ex ante social
welfare.
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1. Introduction
Our current understanding of how the design of credible monetary institutions
ensures greater economic stability has been signi!cantly improved by the contracting
approach pushed forward by Walsh (1995), Persson and Tabellini (1993) and Svensson
(1995). This principal–agent literature argues that the in1ationary bias due to the time
inconsistency of monetary policy 1 can be avoided by delegating through contract the
implementation of this policy to a central banker (thereafter CB) who is separated
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from the main government body. 2 This physical separation is often viewed as an
ingredient of the CB’s independence from the political sphere since it certainly insulates
somewhat monetary policy from the day-to-day in1uence of political authorities and
from 1uctuations in the preferences of those political principals. However, the 1ip-side
of this separation is that the CB may then be subject to various political pressures
coming from organized interest groups willing to push their own views of what should
be monetary policy. 3
In this paper, we combine those two elements to obtain a more complete view of the
political mechanisms which in1uence monetary policies. The CB is both subject to the
explicit in1uence of elected political principals and to the implicit in1uence of interest
groups which want to capture monetary policy. The choice of the CB legal status,
i.e., whether he is independent or aDliated to the elected political principals, aEects
then the scope for capture of the monetary policy by private interests and diEerent
institutional choices lead to quite diEerent policy outcomes. Under independence, the
CB is less controlled by political principals and more responsive to interest groups.
However, this status also isolates monetary policy from 1uctuations in the identity of
the elected political principals. As a result of this trade-oE, the independence of the
CB appears as an institutional best response to the threat of capture under political
uncertainty.
Our view of central banking as balancing political versus private interests in1uences
on monetary policy is inherited from Friedman (1962, 1972). According to him, central
bank independence “embodies the very appealing idea that it is essential to prevent
monetary policy from being a day-to-day plaything at the mercury of every whim
of the current political authorities” but the 1ip-side of independence is that the CB
becomes too much receptive to the “point of view of bankers”, an organized interest
group attempting to in1uence monetary policy. Consequently, Friedman rejected CB
independence arguing that if elected politicians cannot be trusted for the conduct of
monetary policy, “money is too important to be left to central bankers”. The extreme
solution suggested by Friedman was an in1exible monetary rule (a !xed growth rate of
money) in order to “insulate monetary policy both from the arbitrary power of a small
group of men not subject to control by the electorate and from the short-run pressures
of partisan politics”. This policy has of course a very high social cost both in terms
of stabilization and in terms of non-responsiveness to changes in the preferences of
society. In this paper, we take a less rigid view of what should be monetary policy
2 A second standard solution to the credibility problem is to rely on reputation (see RogoE (1989) for a
survey). However, this non-institutional solution suEers from the well-known existence of multiple equilibria
some of which still leave some room for discretionary policy. A third solution is to delegate the imple-
mentation of monetary policy to an in1ation averse CB as in RogoE (1985). As stressed by Walsh (1998,
Chapter 8), this approach suEers from the fact that nothing prevents further delegation by the CB himself
and, more importantly, from the fact that governments may !nd hard to distinguish among various central
bankers with diEerent preferences.
3 As an example of capture of a CB, Cukierman (1998, Chapter 23) reports that, post to First World
War, allies insisted on granting independence of the German CB from the German Chancelor to insulate
this CB from the government’s political pressures. This resulted in discount bills for private industrialists
and bankers who, after the change, had better representation on the Board.
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and investigate how contracts and institutions for monetary policy can be designed to
trade-oE the desire to insulate monetary policies from political authorities and the need
to make those institutions robust to capture by private interests.
To tackle these issues, we take a broad view of the control that a political princi-
pal exerts on the CB. These control rights involve not only the design of the CB’s
incentive scheme but also whether the CB can be removed or not after an election.
When the CB is under political control, a newly elected political principal can choose
a new CB aDliated to him. 4 Instead, under political independence, the CB cannot be
!red by the elected political principal. 5 Contrary to the existing contracting literature,
the CB’s incentive contracts are not designed by social planners but by partisan po-
litical principals who want to please diEerent constituencies and express thus diEerent
concerns for the trade-oE between price control and surprise in1ation depending on
whether they represent a leftist or a rightist constituency. Because of informational
asymmetry between the CB and the government, there is also scope for a collusion
between private interest groups and the CB. 6 However, the scope for capture depends
on the exact control rights that principals retain on the CB. In this framework, we ask
whether granting political independence to the CB improves social welfare, whether
more political independence makes monetary policy more sensitive to the in1uence of
interest groups, and we !nally investigate how those incentive contracts depend on the
legal status of the CB.
We show that the threat of capture on monetary policy increases the political 1uc-
tuations in monetary policy induced by the game of regime switching between rightist
and leftist parties. Indeed, at the margin, left- and right-wing parties react diEerently to
the threat of capture. The leftist party being more concerned by expansionary policies
!nds at the margin easier to !ght capture by an anti-in1ationist interest group. How-
ever, granting political independence to the CB somewhat insulates monetary policy
from these political 1uctuations: A stabilization e9ect. The cost of independence is
nevertheless that the CB is more prone to capture by interest groups: A delegation
e9ect. The stabilization eEect is always strong enough to dominate the delegation
eEect. Hence, ex ante social welfare is greater under political independence than under
political control. When capture of the monetary policy is a crucial concern, it is so-
cially optimal to reduce the politically induced 1uctuations of in1ation it induces. This
is better achieved by granting political independence to the CB who better stabilizes
those 1uctuations around a middle-road policy. Political independence is thus an opti-
mal institutional response to the threat of capture in a world of political uncertainty. 7
4 This extreme assumption is in fact a modeling short-cut to capture settings where the elected principal
can change a signi!cative number of Board members after the elections as in most countries.
5 In practice, the status of the ECB sets the term of oDce for his President at 8 years reducing thereby
the control of (often shorter lived) European governments on this CB.
6 See Tirole (1986) and LaEont and Tirole (1993, Chapter 11) for similar collusion models in the regulation
literature.
7 Even though, we derive this result in a model where an anti-in1ationist interest group exerts pressure
on the government, it is independent on whether anti- or pro-in1ationist pressures are exerted on the CB.
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The design of monetary institutions in a framework of regime switching between
partisan political principals has already been addressed in models Ka la RogoE (1985)
where, instead of being corrected through an incentive scheme, the CB’s preferences
on the output–in1ation trade-oE can be chosen at the outset. The corresponding de!-
nition of independence is then related to the timing of the CB’s appointment. A CB
is independent when he is cooperatively appointed by the partisan parties before the
elections. Along these lines, Waller (1989) and Alesina and Gatti (1995) show how
politically induced 1uctuations in output and growth can be stabilized under inde-
pendence. In Alesina and Gatti (1995) for instance, political independence stabilizes
in1ation 1uctuations because the private sector expectations are formed before any po-
litical uncertainty is resolved. By analyzing the diEerence in agency costs associated
to the diEerent legal status, we get a similar result without relying on the questionable
assumption that private agents lock themselves into nominal contracts before the reso-
lution of electoral uncertainty. 8 Waller (1992) studies how the timing of appointments
and elections aEects the CB’s degree of in1ation aversion. 9 Paralleling this insight in
a contracting framework, we relate also the timing of nominations to the exact control
rights exerted by the political principals and we investigate also how this timing aEects
agency costs, contract design and institutional choices. 10 Finally, our analysis borrows
the methodology of Faure-Grimaud and Martimort (2000) who provide a theory of
political independence for regulatory agencies but we apply this framework to a more
complex macroeconomic environment.
Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 analyzes the case of political independence.
It stresses how the variance of in1ation can be used as a tool to constrain collusive
behavior between an anti-in1ationist interest group and a CB.
Section 4 shows how the nature of this collusion changes under political indepen-
dence and how the legal status of the CB aEects the monetary policies chosen by
partisan governments. We demonstrate there that political independence reduces the
1uctuations in the variance of in1ation. Section 5 provides some welfare analysis and
discusses the optimal institutional choice. Section 6 introduces pro-in1ationist groups
and shows the robustness of our results. Section 7 concludes and discusses possible
extensions of our framework. Proofs are relegated to an appendix.
2. The model
This model describes the relationship between an elected political principal, a CB
and the private sector in a two-tier contracting model of monetary policy. The polit-
ical principal can be thought of as the elected legislative or executive branch of the
8 Gar!nkel and Glazer (1994) argue for instance that “rational economic agents involved in contract
negotiation are likely to time their activities to avoid uncertainty revolving around elections”. They also
show that economic agents expect diEerent conditions under diEerent political environments.
9 See also O’Flaherty (1990) for a principal–agent model discussing the optimal term length of CBs.
10 See also Waller and Walsh (1996) for some insights on the role of the CB’s terms of oDce on the
degree of surprise in1ation.
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government. 11 He maximizes the well-being of his constituency. Because he is better
informed on economic conditions, the eEective control of monetary target is left to a
CB who has discretion in choosing the in1ation target within those initially suggested
by the political principal. The political principal has some control on his CB and can
put some constraints on the agency decision-making process through the ex ante design
of an incentive contract. 12
2.1. Preferences
CB: The CB receives a monetary transfer s from whichever political principal gets
elected. This transfer can be viewed as the budget of the CB, his private bene!ts and
“prestige” drawn from holding oDce or as a reduced form for his “career concerns”.
The CB’s utility writes as V = s:
Political principals: Contrary to the whole contracting approach to central banking,
the CB’s incentive contract is not set by a benevolent legislature. Partisan political
principals want indeed to please particular constituencies which give them political
support. Following the “partisan politics” literature, political principals have diEerent
preferences regarding the trade-oE between in1ation and unemployment. Depending
on whether they defend a “leftist” or a “rightist” constituency, they are more or less
inclined to prefer suprise in1ation to price stabilization. A political principal maximizes
an objective function Ka la Barro and Gordon (1983):
SWi =−
	2
2
+ i
(	− 	e)− s; (2.1)
where 	 is the in1ation level, 	e its expectations and i ¿ 0 (with i∈{L; R}) is the
weight that the political principal puts on creating surprise in1ation.13;14 
 is a macro-
economic shock aEecting both political principals’ concerns for output expansion. 15
11 Havrilesky (1993) and Froyen et al. (1993) have shown that the executive branches has a stronger
in1uence than the legislative one on monetary policy conducted in the U.S.
12 This control can be explicit as in New Zealand nowadays but could also be more implicit. Beck (1987),
for instance, argues that presidential preferences for monetary policy are somewhat transmitted to the Fed
even if the exact mechanism requires further study. See also Wooley (1984) for a similar view.
13 A quite similar objective function would also be obtained in a model where political principals have an
objective function SWi =−	2=2− (i=2)(y− y∗)2 and output is given by the Philips curve y= 	− 	e + 

as it can be easily checked by simple computations.
14 Our results are robust to the exact speci!cation of the marginal cost of the CB’s wages in the principal’s
objective function. This means that they hold also if this objective function is written as SWi = −	2=2 +
i
(	−	e)−s; for any ¿ 0. Introducing this extra parameter would only help to parameterize the size of
the agency problem between the political principal and the CB without consequences on the main insights
of the analysis. This also shows that even an in!nitesimal value of  is enough to make the agency problem
relevant for the optimal choice of institutions.
15 Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) use the alternative formulation: SWi = −	2=2 + (i + 
)(	 − 	e) − s
where the shock aEecting the political principals’ willingness to expand output enters additively. With such a
formulation, there would be no diEerence between the monetary policies of a rightist and a leftist government
under full commitment. Our multiplicative speci!cation introduces such a diEerence. This diEerence turns
out to be the crucial factor for the politically induced 1uctuations of monetary policy.
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Finally, the CB’s utility has no weight in the political principal’s objective function
since the latter is only concerned with the well-being of groups with signi!cant electoral
power. 16
The random variable i may be either high ( = L with probability 1− p) or low
(= R with probability p) depending on whether the elected government defends the
leftist or the rightist constituency. A rightist government is less willing to create suprise
in1ation than a leftist one. We denote by P= L − R¿ 0 the degree of polarization
of this society, i.e., the diEerence between the concerns for surprise in1ation between a
leftist party and a rightist one. As in most models of partisan politics, the probabilities
that each of these two political principals gets elected are exogenous.
For further references, we de!ne also a measure of aggregate social welfare as
SW =−	
2
2
+ ˆ
(	− 	e)− s;
where ˆ = pR + (1− p)L. This expression is simply an average of both principals’
objective functions weighted by the probability that each of them gets elected.
Interest groups: We !rst focus on the case of political pressures for anti-in1ationist
policies. 17 A typical example of an anti-in1ationist group is given by the !nancial
sector. Indeed, as other authors have noticed, !nancial institutions earn their living
by borrowing short and lending long. Similarly, securities dealers hold highly levered
balance sheets. These groups are thus hurt by surprise in1ation. 18 Posen (1995) has
also pushed the view that the !nancial sector provides the political support for the
independence of the CB. As we will see below, this statement is consistent with the
fact that the !nancial sector may bene!t from the independence of the CB to increase
the scope for capture. On related lines, Blinder (1999) underlines the strong in1uence of
!nancial markets on monetary policy and the risk of such an in1uence when he claims
“My point is simply that delivering the policy that [!nancial] markets expect–or indeed
demand–may lead to very poor policy”.
As a matter of fact, collusion between the CB and the banking system is more
likely in countries where the CB supervises the banking system because supervision
creates a particular link between the CB and the banking sector. The CB might consider
that its prime objective is to protect the anti-in1ationist objectives of banks and not
to realize the optimal monetary policy. This is certainly why some countries, like
United Kingdom, have recently removed supervision from the scope of their CB’s
activities.
16 Alternatively, suppose that political principals’ objective functions also involve the utility V of the
bureaucrat but that there is a positive cost of public funds . Then this objective function writes as SWi =
−	2=2 + i
(	 − 	e) + V − (1 + )s and, again, an in!nitesimal value of  is enough to make the agency
problem relevant for the optimal choice of institutions.
17 We discuss also in Section 6 how pro-in1ationist interest groups could enter the picture.
18 Kane (1980) argues that builders and construction unions form also anti-in1ationist interest groups for
similar reasons.
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The anti-in1ationist interest group gets a utility from unexpected in1ation which is
equal to
IG =−
(	− 	e);
where  is a positive parameter.
2.2. Information
The shock 
 is drawn from a common knowledge distribution on  = {
; 
} with
respective probabilities  and 1 − . It is convenient for what follows to use the nor-
malization 
 = 1 and we denote P
 = 1 − 
¿ 0. Anti-in1ationist incentives are the
thus greatest when 
 realizes.
The CB and the interest group have complete information on the shock 
. Typically,
the CB and the anti-in1ationist !nancial sector have an earlier access to data relevant
for determining money demand than the public. 19 Instead, at the time of designing
the CB’s incentives, political principals and the (non-!nancial) private sector remain
uninformed on the exact value of this shock. 20
Political principals have to rely on a revelation mechanism to obtain this information
from the CB.
This information structure has already been stressed by some authors. In an em-
pirical analysis, Peek et al. (1999) have discussed the complementarity between bank
supervisory responsibilities and monetary policy. They showed that con!dential bank
supervisory information could help the Board staE to obtain more accurately forecast
on important macroeconomic variables and is used by FOMC members to guide mon-
etary policy. Indeed, problems in the banking sector may serve as an early indicator
of deteriorating macroeconomics conditions. Moreover, this information could provide
advance notice of changes in bank lending behavior which would aEect the credit
channel of monetary policy.
Lastly, we assume that 
 is a piece of information which cannot be fully manipulated.
The CB can hide veri!able evidences on the fact that the economy is doing badly (
)
and announces instead that 
ˆ=
. The mere possibility that the CB can hide such pieces
of information will be key to understand the scope for collusion with an anti-in1ationist
interest group. On the contrary, the CB can make credible reports that the economy
goes well by showing hard econometric evidences.
19 Instead of assuming that the interest group and the CB shares the knowledge on 
; one could assume that
only the CB knows the true state of nature and can credibly release this information to the anti-in1ationist
interest group to initiate some collusion. As we will see below, collusion increases the supervisor’s wage.
Hence, the CB credibly sharing information may be rationalized as an equilibrium move in a model where
the decision to share or not information is endogenized.
20 Eventually all agents may get the same information set. However, what matters to design the CB’s
incentive contract is the information which can be made veri!able and thus contracted upon at the time of
contracting.
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2.3. Incentive contracts
The grand-contract between the elected political principal and the CB consists of
wages s and in1ation targets 	. In our framework, the Revelation Principle applies
and there is no loss of generality in restricting the elected principals to oEer direct
revelation mechanisms {(si; 	i); (si; 	i)} where i∈{R; L}. The CB chooses within this
menu according to his report on the state of the economy. 21 (si; 	i) (resp. (si; 	i))
represents, respectively, the wage and the in1ation target when the economy goes well

 (resp. goes badly, 
). 22
2.4. Capture
We model the congruence of interests between anti-in1ationist interest groups and the
CB as a collusion, or side-contract, along the lines of Tirole (1986, 1992) and LaEont
and Tirole (1993, Chapter 11). By bribing the CB, the interest group in1uences the
latter’s choice of in1ation target within the menu proposed by the elected political
principal.
Scope for capture: When a bad state of the economy realizes, the anti-in1ationist
interest groups would like that the CB reports 
 to keep in1ation low. By having the
CB misreport to the political principal, the interest group bene!ts from a stake which
is equal to 
((	i − 	ei )− (	i − 	ei ))= P	i: The interest group is not willing to bribe
the CB for misreporting when 
 realizes since doing so would increase in1ation. 23
Transaction costs of side-contracting: The interest group in1uences the CB through
monetary bribes. Making this assumption is an helpful modeling short-cut since these
bribes may actually take the form of various in-kind or implicit favors. 24 However,
because of the illegal nature of capture, the side-contract between this group and the
CB suEers from some transaction costs. 25 Transferring  units of wealth to the CB
increases his private bene!ts from holding oDce only by K() where − K() repre-
sents the transaction costs of side-contracting. To characterize explicitly the institutional
response to the threat of capture, we stipulate a particular functional form for K(),
namely:
K() = k− r
2
2;
21 Of course, in the real world, the CB sets the short-term nominal interest rate instead of the in1ation
rate. We take this short-cut to focus on the political economy of the model in the simplest way.
22 As in any principal–agent model, ex post once the CB has chosen the monetary policy within the menu
that will be proposed by the principal, the principal gets information and would like to renegotiate the menu.
However, this renegotiation possibility would be anticipated by the CB and the cost of it would be imperfect
revelation in the !rst place. Assuming full commitment by the political principals helps us to de!ne an upper
bound on what can be achieved under the threat of capture.
23 This absence of any scope for collusion justi!es also our information structure assuming that 
 is the
only state of nature which can indeed be manipulated.
24 Dixit (1998) also models the implicit in1uence on a European CB exerted by non-cooperating national
governments in a common agency framework with explicit side-transfers.
25 See Tirole (1992) for an exhaustive discussion of the origins of these transaction costs.
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where 0¡k6 1 and r ¿ 0. We consider constellations of parameters such that poten-
tial bribes will belong to the interval [0; kr ] where K(·) is increasing. Note also that
K(·) is strictly concave. These two assumptions capture the fact that transferring more
wealth to the CB makes easier for the interest group to aEect his decision-making but
that the marginal eDciency of doing so decreases. 26
Lastly, the CB has all the bargaining power at the side-contracting stage and ap-
propriates most of the gains of his collusion with the interest group. The bribe given
to the CB when he misreports the state of nature is thus worth the whole stake of
capture, P	i.
2.5. The legal status of the central bank
The CB has political independence (hereafter superscript PI) when he cannot be
removed from oDce by newly elected political principals. Political independence does
not mean that the elected political principal loses all control on the CB since the CB
still receives a contract from this elected principal. 27 Under independence, the elected
political principal has lost only his control of the appointment procedure for members
of the board of the central bank. Under political control (hereafter superscript PC), a
new CB is appointed each time a new political principal gets elected. The principal
has control rights on who should be the head of the central bank.
2.6. Timings of the game
The timing of the game depends on the legal status of the central bank only through
the new collusion possibilities that independence opens.
We !rst envision the case where a new CB is appointed each time a new political
principal gets elected.
T = 0: The electoral outcome realizes and the preferences of the elected political
principal i are known by all players including the private sector of the economy.
T = 1: The CB receives a grand-contract from the political principal who has just
been elected. This contract stipulates wages and in1ation targets. The private sector
forms its expectations on in1ation and negotiates wage contracts.
T =2: Ex post collusion stage. If he has accepted the grand-contract, the CB oEers
a side-contract to the interest group. This side-contract is accepted or refused.
T = 3: 
 is learned by the CB and the interest group.
T = 4: The CB makes an announcement 
ˆ on the state of the economy and the
corresponding in1ation target and wage are implemented. Side-transfers, if any, are
exchanged.
26 Note that the technology of side-contracting is also independent of the legal status of the CB. It is a
priori as easy to capture an independent CB and a non-independent one.
27 In most developed countries, the CB is indeed always (at least informally) vertically subordinated to
either the executive or the legislative branch of the government. Our de!nition of political independence !ts
thus with that given in Grilli et al. (1991).
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An important assumption should be stressed at this point. The fact that the CB is
aDliated to a particular political principal and is only removed once a new politi-
cal principal gets elected implies that the collusive side-contract can only be signed
ex post, i.e., once the elected political principal has already appointed his CB.
Under political independence, political parties propose monetary policies to the CB
before political uncertainty resolves. 28 One can view these proposals as the campaign
platforms of the two candidates. 29 Collusion can now takes place also ex ante.
T = 0: Both political parties propose non-cooperatively their electoral platforms.
These platforms consist of incentive contracts to the CB. These grand-contracts stipulate
budgets and in1ation targets conditionally on the fact that the oEering party gets elected.
The CB accepts or refuses both grand-contracts being still uninformed on the state of
the economy 
.
T = 1: Ex ante collusion stage. If he has accepted the grand-contracts, the CB
oEers a side-contract to the interest group. This side-contract is now conditional on the
electoral outcome.
T = 2: The electoral outcome realizes and the preferences of the political principal
i are known by all players including the private sector of the economy which now
forms its expectations on in1ation.
Stages T = 3 and 4 are then the same as with aDliated CBs.
Under political independence, the CB has thus the ability to commit to a side-contract
with the anti-in1ationist interest group before political uncertainty resolves. It is useful
to already stress that this commitment ability is the source of the CB’s own bene!t
from independence as we will see later.
Note that the sequence of events is such that the private sector knows precisely who
gets elected before setting wage contracts. 30 Also, in both cases, side-contracting takes
place before the realization of the state of nature.
2.7. A benchmark with complete information
For future references, we derive the optimal monetary policy when a political prin-
cipal with preferences i (i∈{L; R}) has complete information on the realization of
shocks, keeps full control on the monetary policy (i.e., does not rely on a CB) and has
the ability to commit to this policy before the private sector forms its expectations and
negotiate wage contracts. Under complete information, the !rst best in1ation targets,
28 This timing captures in a simple way the enlarged opportunities for capture which are oEered to the CB
without having to consider a fully dynamic model. As we will see below, this shows already how budgets
for independent CB must be increased to prevent the scope for capture.
29 Invoking standard reputational arguments, we assume that those platforms are binding commitments once
the elected principal comes to oDce.
30 This assumption is thus in sharp contrast with Alesina and Gatti (1995) who argue that political uncer-
tainty aEects monetary policy when it is embodied into the private sector’s expectations. We assume that
wage contracts in the private sector are 1exible enough to be changed just after elections. The only diEerence
between the case of political independence and the case of political control comes thus from the nature of
agency costs which will dramatically diEer depending on the exact institutional setting.
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	FBi and 	
FB
i , oEered by the elected political principal i maximize expected welfare
de!ned as
Max
{	i;	i}

(
−	
2
i
2
+ i
(	i − 	ei )
)
+ (1− )
(
−	
2
i
2
+ i(	i − 	ei )
)
s.t.
	ei = 	i + (1− )	i: (2.2)
Rewriting the principal’s objective as a function of average in1ation 	ei and the diEer-
ence in in1ation targets P	i = 	i − 	i, the principal’s problem becomes
Max
{	ei ;P	i}
− (	
e
i )
2
2
+ (1− )
(
iP
P	i − (P	i)
2
2
)
:
Since the political principal has the ability to commit to this policy rule, the optimal
monetary policy entails no in1ationary bias:
	FBei = 0: (2.3)
The diEerence in in1ation targets between both states of the world is thus
P	FBi = iP
¿ 0: (2.4)
Greater concerns of the political principals for surprise in1ation (i.e., i larger) increase
therefore the variance of in1ation (1− )(P	i)2. In1ation is positive (resp. negative)
	FBi = iP
 (resp. 	
FB
i = −(1 − )iP
) when a bad (resp. good) shock hits the
economy. For further references, we observe that the political induced 1uctuations in
the variance of in1ation depend only on the degree of polarization since
P	FBL −P	FBR =P
P:
The commitment policy above has been extensively criticized for not being time-
consistent. In what follows, we investigate instead how this policy is robust to po-
litical pressures. Taking this perspective highlights that diEerent institutional designs
oEer diEerent responses to agency problems. It is not the lack of credibility that distorts
the CB’s incentives but the fact that the it may report excessively good news on the
economy when it is captured by an anti-in1ationist interest group who wants to avoid
expansionary policies.
3. Monetary policy under political control
We now derive the second best in1ation targets obtained when the political principal
with preferences i is elected but relies on a privately informed, captured but aDliated
CB to implement his most preferred monetary policy.
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3.1. Collusion-proofness constraint
To truthfully report, the CB must be suDciently rewarded so that colluding with the
anti-in1ationist interest group becomes a dominated strategy. The grand-contract must
thus satisfy a collusion-proofness constraint: 31
si − si¿K(P	i): (3.1)
The left-hand side of (3.1) represents the wage diEerential necessary to prevent col-
lusive behavior and to induce truthful announcement by the CB. The right-hand side
of (3.1) represents the bene!ts that the CB can pocket from his collusive relationship
with the anti-in1ationist interest group. This bene!t takes into account the transaction
costs dissipated in side-contracting.
Importantly, the collusion-proofness constraint derived above is a function of P	i
only. It depends thus only on the variance of in1ation and not on its expectation.
Henceforth, the nature of this collusion-proofness constraint is actually consistent with
any timing for the formation of the private sector’s expectations. The private sector can
sign wage contracts indiEerently before or after side-contracting has occurred without
aEecting the nature of the collusion-proofness constraint.
Finally, we assume thereafter that the following condition holds
Assumption 0. k=r ¿iP
 for i∈{R; L}, so that the !rst best in1ation targets yields
a stake of capture belonging to the set of bribes where K(·) is increasing.
3.2. Participation constraint
The CB prefers to enter the public sector rather than getting an exogenous reservation
utility normalized at zero. The following participation constraint must be satis!ed:
si¿ 0: (3.2)
Note that, when P	i = 	i − 	i ¿ 0, (3.1) and (3.2) imply also that si ¿ 0. This latter
participation constraint can be omitted in what follows as long as the stake for collusion
remains positive. To insure this, we assume that
Assumption 1. k¡iP
 for i∈{R; L}. 32
Finally, to guarantee concavity of the principals’ problem when collusion is a con-
cern, we also impose that
Assumption 2. r2¡.
31 Tirole (1986) and LaEont and Tirole (1991, Chapter 11) prove that there is no loss of generality in
restricting the principal to oEer collusion-proof mechanisms in similar models.
32 The principal will never !nd optimal to oEer in1ation targets such that P	i is negative at the optimal
contract. Indeed, when Assumption 1 does not hold, it is easy to see that the optimal contract entails 	i=	i=0
and that there is no stake for collusion.
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Assumptions 0 and 2 are automatically satis!ed when r is small enough, i.e., when
the transaction costs of side-contracting are small enough.
3.3. Optimal inAation targets
Under asymmetric information and the threat of capture, an optimal monetary policy
proposed by principal i must implement collusion-proofness at a minimal agency cost:
ACPCi (P	i) = Min{si ; si}
si + (1− )si
s.t. (3.1) and (3.2).
Both constraints are obviously binding, otherwise the principal could oEer the same
in1ation targets and reduce at least one transfer to the CB, increasing thereby his
constituency’s well-being. Note that the CB is thus rewarded when he announces that
the economy faces a bad shock and chooses an expansionary policy since si ¿ 0.
Instead, when a good shock hits, the CB gets no reward. Intuitively, to !ght capture
the CB must be rewarded to announce news which hurt the interest group.
With political control, the agency cost associated with the delegation of monetary
policy to the CB writes thus as
ACPCi (P	i) = (1− )K(P	i):
The optimal collusion-proof monetary policy with an aDliated CB solves
Max
{	ei ;P	i}
− (	
e
i )
2
2
+ (1− )
(
iP
P	i − (P	i)
2
2
)
− ACPCi (P	i):
We index with a superscript PC meaning political control this optimal policy. Direct
optimization yields immediately
Proposition 1. Assume that Assumptions 1 and 2 both hold. Under asymmetric in-
formation and political control, the optimal collusion-proof monetary policy o9ered
by a political principal with preferences i entails:
–No inAationary bias
	PCei = 0:
–The di9erence in inAation targets is
P	PCi =
iP
− k=
1− r2= :
33 (3.3)
–The variance of inAation is positive but lower than under complete information since
0¡P	PCi ¡P	
FB
i : (3.4)
No inAationary bias: The threat of capture of the central bank does not aEect the
ability of political principals to avoid any in1ationary bias. Even if it is somewhat
33In the absence of any collusion (k = r = 0) the !rst best monetary policy is still implemented.
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undermined by asymmetric information, delegating monetary policy to a CB before the
private sector forms its expectations still helps the elected political principal to commit
and to correct ex post incentives for surprise in1ation. Of course, this contract is now
aEected by the principal’s desire to avoid the capture of monetary policy. Nevertheless,
solving the collusion problem does not con1ict with maintaining credibility.
Variance of inAation: Comparing (2.4) with (3.3), we observe that delegation of
monetary policy to a better informed CB requires to reduce the variance of in1ation.
The outcome of the political process is such that the political principal looks more
in1ation averse than what he really is. Indeed, the policy outcome is exactly the same
as if the political principal runs himself the monetary policy, gets perfect information
on the macroeconomic shock but had his preference parameter i being replaced with
′i() such that
′i() = i
(
1− k=iP

1− r2=
)
¡i;
where the right-hand side inequality follows from Assumptions 0 and 2. Everything
happens thus as if the preferences of the anti-in1ationist interest groups were some-
what embodied into the preferences of the political principals. Anticipating the po-
litical pressures for stringent monetary policies, the principal behaves as being more
in1ation-averse. The fact that monetary policy looks like being implemented by a
more in1ation-averse government does not come from any bias for low in1ation in the
CB’s preferences but from the fact that the monetary policy must satisfy a collusion-
proofness constraint which appears endogenously in a framework with asymmetric
information.
By reducing the variance of in1ation below its !rst best value, the political princi-
pal reduces the stake of collusion with an anti-in1ationist interest group. Information
on economic shocks is thus obtained at a lower cost. The right-hand side of (3.1) is
reduced and the socially costly wage given to the CB to satisfy this constraint dimin-
ishes. Of course, since a leftist party is more prone to run an expansionary policy, it
oEers large collusive stake and suEers thereby more from the threat of capture by an
anti-in1ationist interest group.
Comparative statics: Interestingly, ′i() decreases with .
34 The political principal
commits to a more conservative policy when the anti-in1ationist interest group has
more pronounced preferences for surprise de1ation. As a result, the optimal variance
of in1ation decreases also with . The threat of capture calls for less 1uctuations in
in1ation than the !rst best policy as the anti-in1ationist interest group becomes more
powerful. Indeed, those groups have then more in1uence on the CB and the stake for
capture increases. This makes collusion-proofness more costly for the political principal.
Decreasing the variance of in1ation prevents thus capture in a less costly way. We note
34 One has indeed: @′i ()=@= (−k− kr2 + 2riP
)=(− r2)2. But the numerator is increasing in 
for ¡m= iP
=k as speci!ed in Assumption 1. Its maximal value is worth −+ r2m which is negative
when Assumption 2 holds.
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also that
P	PCL −P	PCR = (′L()− ′R())P

=P
P
(
1
1− r2=
)
¿P	FBL −P	FBR : (3.5)
This latter equality shows that the possibility of capture increases the political induced
1uctuations in the variance of in1ation.
Finally, a greater value of r increases also the optimal choice of the variance of in1a-
tion made by the political principals. Indeed, when r increases, collusion becomes less
eDcient. Both political principals !nd it less valuable to reduce the variance of in1ation
to !ght capture which is less of a concern. Their objectives become more dissonant
and the politically induced 1uctuations in the variance of in1ation also increase.
The social planner outcome: Had a social planner been ruling monetary policy with
the help of a possibly captured CB, the variance of in1ation would still be given by
formula (3.3) but with ˆ replacing i. The corresponding standard deviation in in1ation
target is exactly the average of those under partisanship since
P	ˆ = pP	PCR + (1− p)P	PCL : (3.6)
Political uncertainty creates thus some politically induced 1uctuations in monetary pol-
icy around the middle-road policy which would be proposed by a social planner who
would be controlling a possibly captured CB. We will see that those 1uctuations are
in fact signi!cantly reduced when political independence is granted to the CB.
4. Ination stabilization under political independence
The politically independent CB implements now the monetary policy for both elected
principals. He now bene!ts from this political independence to oEer a side-contract to
the anti-in1ationist interest group even before political uncertainty is resolved.
4.1. Ex ante collusion
Side-contracting takes now place ex ante and this is the expected stake of capture
when 
 realizes, namely (pP	R + (1 − p)P	L), which matters to characterize the
maximal bribe that the anti-in1ationist group is ready to give up to the CB to make
him lie on his announcement of the economic shock. To prevent this ex ante collusion,
both political principals must collectively oEer policy platforms giving an expected
wage to the CB which is greater than what he may obtain from side-contracting. The
corresponding ex ante collusion-proofness constraint writes thus as
p(sR − sR) + (1− p)(sL − sL)¿K((pP	R + (1− p)P	L)): (4.1)
Of course, the CB could also wait for the outcome of the election before oEering any
side-contract at all and enter into ex post collusions which would look alike those
368 E. Gabillon, D. Martimort / European Economic Review 48 (2004) 353–378
considered in Section 3. However, the CB strictly prefers to commit to a side-contract
before political uncertainty resolves. Indeed, because the eDciency of side-contracting
K(·) is a strictly concave function of the collusive stake, we always have
K((pP	R + (1− p)P	L))¿pK(P	R) + (1− p)K(P	L): (4.2)
We have already seen that (3.1) is binding at the optimal contract with ex post
side-contracting. Hence, for a given pair of monetary policies ({	R; 	R}; {	L; 	L}),
the right-hand side above represents the expected wages to be given to the CB if
side-contracts occur only ex post. Political independence, since it allows ex ante side-
contracting, makes thus collusion between the CB and the interest group harder to
prevent.
Only the expectations of the wage diEerentials si − si (i∈{R; L}) is determined
when the ex ante collusion-proofness constraint (4.1) is binding as it will be the case
in equilibrium. However, since the left-hand side of (4.2) is strictly greater than the
right-hand side, it is possible to !nd values of sR−sR and sL−sL such that both ex post
collusion-proofness constraints (3.1) are strictly satis!ed at the Nash equilibrium be-
tween both parties. Ex ante collusion-proofness implies thus ex post collusion-proofness.
This means that, even if the collusive partners cannot commit not to collude ex post,
i.e., once the political principal is elected, this collusion will not matter, since it will
not be bene!cial to the CB anyway.
4.2. Equilibrium inAation targets
Platforms on monetary policies are now oEered non-cooperatively by both parties
before the elections. We are thus looking for a Nash equilibrium between the two
possible political principals of a common bureaucracy. Taking as given the wages and
the in1ation targets promised by the leftist government, the optimal monetary policy
oEered by the rightist government implements collusion-proofness at minimal cost when
it solves
ACPIR (P	R) = Min{sR; sR}
sR + (1− )sR
s.t. (4.1) and (3.2).
Both constraints are again binding and the agency cost borne by the rightist govern-
ment under political independence writes thus as
ACPIR (P	R) =
1
p
(1− )(K((pP	R + (1− p)P	L))− (1− p)(sL − sL)):
The monetary policy oEered when the CB bene!ts from political independence solves
Max
{	eR;P	R}
− (	
e
R)
2
2
+ (1− )
(
RP
P	R − (P	R)
2
2
)
− ACPIR (P	R):
The following proposition characterizes the Nash equilibrium of this game. We index
with a superscript PI meaning political independence of these policies.
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Proposition 2. Assume that Assumptions 1 and 2 both hold. Under asymmetric infor-
mation and political independence, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium between the
political principals with (4.1) being binding. The equilibrium monetary policy o9ered
by a political principal with preferences i entails:
–No inAationary bias
	PIei = 0:
–If political principal i gets elected, the di9erence in the inAation targets chosen by
the CB is
P	PIR =
RP
− k=+ (r2=)(1− p)P
P
1− r2= (4.3)
and
P	PIL =
LP
− k=− (r2=)pP
P
1− r2= : (4.4)
–Moreover, the variance of inAation is reduced under political independence and we
have
P	PCR ¡P	
PI
R ¡P	
PI
L ¡P	
PC
L (4.5)
with
pP	PIR + (1− p)P	PIL = pP	PCR + (1− p)P	PCL =P	ˆ: (4.6)
Stabilization of the variance of inAation: Comparing (3.3) with (4.3) and (4.4),
we observe that the variance of in1ation is signi!cantly aEected by the legal status
of the CB. Under political independence, a rightist (resp. leftist) government increases
(resp. decreases) the variance of in1ation and looks now much more alike a leftist
(resp. rightist) government. Indeed, increasing P	R by ! increases the agency cost of
delegation borne by the rightist government by an amount (1 − )!K ′(pP	R + (1 −
p)P	L). Since a leftist government is more willing to create surprise in1ation than
a rightist one, we have P	R¡P	L so that the right-hand side above is smaller than
(1− )!K ′(P	R) since K(·) is concave. This last term is in fact the marginal agency
cost incurred by the elected rightist government when it increases by ! the variance of
in1ation, the CB is under its political control and collusion occurs thus only ex post.
Therefore, the rightist government is more willing to implement an expansionary policy
under political independence since the marginal agency cost of delegation decreases
from its point of view. Similarly but for the reverse reasons, the leftist government’s
willingness to decrease the variance of in1ation increases under political independence.
As a result, the leftist government looks like a more in1ation-averse government than
what it really is. In both cases, everything happens as if the political principal had his
preferences i being modi!ed to incorporate not only the pressure of interest groups as
in Section 3 but also the political strength of the non-elected minority. For a rightist
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government, ′R() is now replaced by 
′′
R() such that
′′R() = R
(
1− k=RP
+ r2(1− p)P=R
1− r2=
)
¿′R():
For a leftist government, ′L() is replaced with 
′′
L () such that
′′L () = L
(
1− k=LP
− r2pP=L
1− r2=
)
¡′L():
That the preferences of the non-elected minority get now somewhat embodied into the
actual policy outcome is directly implied by the fact that the ex ante collusion-proofness
constraint makes the actual agency costs borne by the elected majority depend also on
the policy which would have been implemented if the minority had instead been elected.
When collusion matters, political independence ensures therefore the convergence of
partisan monetary policies towards the socially optimal level of in1ations implemented
by a social planner. Keeping the same average variance of in1ation than under political
control (see (4.6)), the independent CB stabilizes the politically induced 1uctuations
in the variance of in1ation. Indeed, comparing the variances of in1ation under both
legal regimes yields
P	PIL −P	PIR =P	FBL −P	FBR =P
P¡P	PCL −P	PCR =
P
P
1− r2= : (4.7)
The extra politically induced 1uctuations in the variance of in1ation introduced by the
possibility of capture are now eliminated. With independence, we !nd back the !rst
best political 1uctuations in monetary policy.
Note that the parameter , i.e., the intensity of the anti-in1ationist interest group’s
preferences for surprise de1ation, does not aEect those politically induced 1uctuations
under independence, contrary to the case of aDliated CBs where those 1uctuations
increases with . The stabilization in the politically induced 1uctuations of in1ation
becomes more signi!cant as the preferences of interest groups are more pronounced.
According to our results, countries with independent CB should have less in1ation
volatility than countries with politically controlled central banks. This fact has received
some empirical back up. In a cross-sectional countries empirical analysis, Cecchetti
et al. (2001) compare the 1980s to the 1990s which witnessed the trend toward central
banks independence. They observe that in1ation volatility has fallen markedly while
output variability has either fallen or risen only slightly. These authors show that this
increased stability is essentially explained by more eDcient monetary policies. Once
one controls for the magnitudes of the shocks hitting each economy, Cecchetti and
Ehrmann (2002) also show that independent (in1ation targeting) CBs achieve less
in1ation volatility for a given level of output volatility. Cukierman (1998, Chapter 22)
deals with the well-known positive correlation between the mean and the variance of
in1ation. For a cross section of countries, his results suggest that at least a seventh
of this correlation between the mean and the standard deviation of in1ation is due to
variations in the degree of CB independence.
E. Gabillon, D. Martimort / European Economic Review 48 (2004) 353–378 371
Comparative statics: The rightist (resp. leftist) government has more incentives to
increase (resp. decrease) the variance of in1ation and thus to look more like a leftist
(resp. rightist) government when the probability that he does not get elected increases.
Even if it turns out that it does not get elected, the party which has the greatest proba-
bility of coming to power sees the monetary policy being signi!cantly shifted towards
the monetary policy it would have implemented had the CB been under its full control.
With a rightist (resp. leftist) government, the size of this upwards (resp. downwards)
shift in the variance of in1ation depends also on the degree of political polarization.
Quite intuitively, more polarization calls also for adding greater corrective terms (resp.
r2(1−p)P
P=(− r2) for a rightist government and −r2pP
P=(− r2) for a
leftist one) to the optimal standard deviation of in1ation implemented under political
control to get its value with political independence. More polarization implies indeed
more politically induced 1uctuations of in1ation both when the CB is under political
control and when he is independent as it can be seen in (4.7). However, those 1uctu-
ations in the variance of in1ation are smaller in the case of political independence.
A greater value of r increases also the size of the corrective terms appearing un-
der political independence. When r is greater, transaction costs of side-contracting are
greater and political principals do not reduce so much the variance of in1ation to pre-
vent collusion. The politically induced 1uctuations of in1ation remain quite large and
the stabilization of monetary policies achieved under political independence is more
valuable.
5. Ex ante welfare and constitutional design
Granting political independence to the CB clearly aEects ex ante welfare since it
changes the in1ation targets which are implemented. To better assess the welfare con-
sequences of the CB’s independence, we now isolate two eEects which are at work
simultaneously. First, as shown by (4.2), the same in1ation targets would be imple-
mented at a higher expected agency cost under political independence than with
political control. This delegation e9ect is clearly a social cost of political indepen-
dence. Political independence makes capture of the CB more costly for society. Second,
assuming that agency costs would be the same with both legal status, i.e., assuming
that, with political independence, the agency costs would still be computed with the
ex post collusion-proofness constraints, social welfare would increase with political
independence since in1ation targets are now better stabilized around their socially op-
timal values and social welfare is a concave function. This captures the stabilization
e9ect of political independence.
To better assess the size of these two eEects and to determine which ends up domi-
nating, we now rewrite social welfare in regime PC and when party i has been elected.
Indeed, taking into account the expressions of the CB’s wages obtained when (3.1)
and (3.2) are both binding, expected social welfare when party i gets elected writes as
a function of P	PCi only:
SW (P	PCi ) = (1− )
((
ˆP
− k

)
P	PCi −
1
2
(
1− r
2

)
(P	PCi )
2
)
:
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Under political control, the expected social welfare writes thus as
SW PC = pSW (P	PCR ) + (1− p)SW (P	PCL ): (5.1)
Under political independence, agency costs take a diEerent expression than under
political control. Taking into account this diEerence, expected social welfare under
independence writes instead as
SW PI = (pSW (P	PIR ) + (1− p)SW (P	PIL ))
+ (1− )(pK(P	PIR ) + (1− p)K(P	PIL )
−K((pP	PIR + (1− p)P	PIL )): (5.2)
The !rst parentheses above is greater than the right-hand side of (5.1) capturing the
stabilization eEect. The second parentheses represents the diEerence in agency costs
between independence and political control when the agency cost under political control
is computed with the in1ation targets obtained under independence. This delegation
eEect is obviously negative from the concavity of K(·). The capture of the CB is
indeed more costly under political independence. Comparing both legal status of the
CB, we de!ne
PSW = SW PI − SW PC:
Proposition 3. From an ex ante social point of view, political independence is the
best response to the threat of capture by anti-inAationist interest groups in a world
of political uncertainty. Moreover, we have
PSW =
(1− )
2
p(1− p)(P)2(P
)2
(
r2
− r2
)
¿ 0: (5.3)
On the one hand, political independence reduces the politically induced 1uctuations
of in1ation but do so by still preserving the mean P	ˆ of P	i. On the other hand,
political independence increases the agency cost of delegation. Nevertheless, the !rst
stabilization eEect always dominates and political independence should be granted to
the CB.
With political independence, the non-elected minority is better protected since the
monetary policy chosen by the independent CB is closer to what would be chosen
by the minority itself. A politically independent CB acts thus as a safeguard against
expropriation of the minority by the elected majority. The best institutional choice gives
more freedom to the independent CB and this plays against biased political principals.
The diEerence in ex ante social welfare between both legal status of the CB in-
creases when the technology of side-contracting is rather bad (r getting larger). As
a consequence, any administrative rule hardening the collusion between the CB and
anti-in1ationist interest groups (so that the latter is better insulated from the in1uence
of this group) makes also the political independence of the CB be more valuable.
E. Gabillon, D. Martimort / European Economic Review 48 (2004) 353–378 373
There exists a complementarity between the legal status of the central bank and those
administrative rules. An example of such rules is a restriction on the length of the CB’s
tenure. Another can be to separate banking supervision from monetary policy so that
the transaction costs of collusion between the CB and the !nancial sector increases.
Similarly, more polarization (P being greater) and more political variance (p(1−p)
being greater) mean also a greater diEerence between the monetary policies imple-
mented by rightist and leftist governments. This exacerbated discrepancy between the
most preferred monetary policies of both parties increases both the stabilization and
the delegation eEect. The bene!ts of granting political independence to the CB are
greater as political uncertainty increases. As a consequence, this independence is more
bene!cial in countries with coalitional governments since the latters are more likely to
change and are characterized by higher political uncertainty.
Once elected, both biased principals dislike CB’s political independence since it
forces them to move monetary policy towards that of the minority. The independent
CB’s ability to commit to ex ante collusion nevertheless signi!cantly stabilizes policies
and make these policies less sensitive to the exact identity of the political principal
who !nally gets elected. This stabilization may be good from an ex ante social welfare
point of view as we have just seen in Proposition 3. To some extent, it may even
be desirable for ideological biased principals before the election takes place: If they
lose, their rival will implement a policy less diEerent from what they would have
done themselves. Indeed, since expected welfare is greater with political independence,
there exist simple ex ante transfers which make both political principals bene!t from
the gains of stabilization. Of course, the relative gain of each of these principals may
depend on the bargaining power of each constituency at the ex ante stage when the
constitution is designed. In particular, if the design of the central bank charter is made
by one of the partisan principals himself, he may be able to grasp most of the bene!ts
from this independence. 35
6. Pro-inationist interest groups
Pro-in1ationist interest groups are diverse. They may be employers who have an
incentive to favor surprise in1ation to pay lower real wages, small businessmen, farm-
ers and borrowers who also bene!t from surprise in1ation when loan contracts are
expressed in nominal terms. Insiders may be particular for reelection concerns,
subgroups of Congressmen may also invest in information gathering and lobby
accordingly for more expansionary monetary policies than what the median unin-
formed political principal wants to implement. Taking the view that the central bank is
35 We should note the diEerence between this discussion and Alesina and Gatti (1995). In the latter paper,
both political principals must agree on the design of the degree of in1ation aversion for the CB in a model
Ka la RogoE (1985) and they do so through ex ante bargaining re1ecting their strengths at the constitutional
stage. Here, the agreement between both parties occurs also ex ante but consists of lump-sum transfers only.
Ex post, the control of the CB and the design of his incentive package is left to whoever gets elected.
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actually a committee, those interest groups can also be seen as particular members
trying to in1uence the head of the agency. 36 This view can be particularly relevant in
the case of central banks having regional representation where some regions can prefer
looser monetary policy. 37 In the context of European monetary policy, countries have
diEerent preferences about in1ation and some countries may be tempted to in1uence
the ECB’s monetary policy if they bene!t from more expansionary policies. Of course,
the status of the ECB explicitly forbids any representative of the European Council to
be part of the ECB’s Council (Art. 15.1) but does not forbid the informal presence of
EEC ODcials at Board Meetings. 38
Such a pro-in1ationist interest group can easily be included into the analysis. To do
so, suppose that such a group has utility AI = "
(	− 	e) for some positive parameter
". When a bad shock hits the economy, the pro-in1ationist interest group opposes to
the incentives of anti-in1ationist interest group which want to make the central banker
lie on the state of nature. The stake for doing so is "P	i when the political principal
i is elected. Without entering into the details of the bargaining procedure between the
CB and the interest groups, it should be clear that the CB cannot receive more bribes
than ( − ")P	i. Intuitively, the CB must leave to the pro-in1ation interest group the
amount "P	i to avoid that the latter behaves as a whistle-blower and report to the
government the true state of nature 
. Consequently, the collusion-proofness constraint
is relaxed and can be written as
si − si¿K(( − ")P	i): (6.1)
Of course, the previous equation is valid as long as the anti-in1ationist groups are
more powerful than pro-in1ationists ones, i.e., ¿". The analysis we made previously
goes through with ′=− " replacing  everywhere. The presence of a countervailing
interest group reduces the political induced 1uctuations of capture and reduces therefore
the bene!ts of granting independence to the CB. Independence is less likely to occur
when anti-in1ationist interest groups are more powerful.
If pro-in1ationist interest groups are more powerful than the anti-in1ationist ones,
the CB would have no incentive to report a good shock when 
 realizes. Instead, when
only the good state of the economy 
 can be manipulated and reported to be worse than
what it really is by the CB, collusion between the CB and the dominant pro-in1ationist
interest group matters. One needs to introduce a collusion-proofness constraint of
the form
si − si¿K(("− )P	i): (6.2)
36 For instance, Faust (1996) argues that members of a CB’s committee are heterogenous with respect to
the distributive consequences of surprise in1ation. Toma (1982) also recognizes the heterogeneity of interest
groups in1uencing the FED’s decision-making and defends the view that the political process is dominated
by forces pushing to increase money supply.
37 In the U.S., monetary policy is made by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) consisting of
the governors of the Federal Reserve System, nominated by the President of the U.S. and !ve Presidents of
regional Reserve Banks on a rotating basis.
38 The mere fact that Art. 7 of the status of the ECB precludes ECB’s board members from receiving explicit
recommendations from national political institutions can be viewed as setting up constraints reducing capture
by national interest groups.
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Without doing the complete analysis, it should !rst be clear that preventing collusion
requires now to give a reward to the CB in the good state of nature. The capture
of the CB also implies that political principals choose a policy P	PCi which is again
smaller than P	FBi to counter the pro-in1ationist political pressures on the CB. The
politically induced 1uctuations in monetary policy are still expressed as in (3.5) but
with  replacing now 1 −  since the manipulation takes place in state 
. Finally, it
is easy to check that the stabilization and delegation eEects are also unchanged. The
welfare analysis made in Section 5 remains valid and justi!es also independence of
the CB.
7. Conclusion
This paper has shown that diEerent legal status of a CB are in fact associated
with diEerent opportunities for capture of the monetary policy by interest groups. The
degree of political independence aEects thus the agency costs paid to control the CB. An
independent CB helps to stabilize the politically induced 1uctuations of in1ation but the
agency costs of delegating monetary policy to such a CB increases also when the latter
is granted political independence. Nevertheless, ex ante social welfare increases with
political independence. This comes from the fact that the politically induced 1uctuations
due to agency costs are better stabilized by an independent CB.
Several extensions of our framework could be discussed. First, it would be particu-
larly interesting to analyze in our contracting framework how granting long-term tenures
to CBs improves ex ante social welfare but may be costly when general economic con-
ditions (like the distribution of shocks aEecting the economy or the preferences of the
agents) may change over time. 39 Second, in our analysis, we have taken the probabil-
ities that both parties get elected as purely exogenous. This has allowed us to explain
the optimal choice of institutions for monetary policy in a world of political uncer-
tainty. However, these probabilities could be endogenized and could thus depend on
the monetary policies proposed by both parties before the elections. As we have seen,
those political platforms are themselves signi!cantly aEected by the legal status of the
CB. Such an extension of the model would also allow us to analyze the interesting
feedback that institutions have on the electoral outcomes. The amount of political un-
certainty and the institutional choice would thus be derived simultaneously. Finally, it
should be stressed that our model could also be extended to the case where princi-
pals have no ability to commit to their incentive contracts. Our comparison between
independence and political control would also be meaningful in this framework.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2. Under Assumption 2, the objective function remains concave
with respect to P	R. of course, 	PIe = 0 at the optimum. Optimizing with respect to
P	R yields immediately the linear relationship characterizing the best response of the
rightist government:
(RP
−P	R) = k − r2(pP	R + (1− p)P	L)): (A.1)
Doing similarly for the leftist party, we would have
(LP
−P	L) = k − r2(pP	R + (1− p)P	L)): (A.2)
Solving this linear system yields the values of the Nash equilibrium variance of in1ation
targets.
Proof of Proposition 3. We have PSW =SW PI−SW PC=A+B where A represents the
stabilization eEect and B the agency eEect. After some computations, we easily !nd
that
A=pSW (P	PIR ) + (1− p)SW (P	PIL )− (pSW (P	PCR ) + (1− p)SW (P	PCL ))
=
(1− )
2
(
1− r
2

)
(Var(P	PCi )− Var(P	PIi ));
where Var(·) denotes the variance operator. After computations, we !nd for the stabi-
lization eEect:
A=
(1− )
2
p(1− p)(P)2(P
)2
(
(r2=)(2− r2=)
1− r2=
)
¿ 0:
We have also for the delegation eEect:
B= (1− )(pK(P	PIR ) + (1− p)K(P	PIL )− K((pP	PIR + (1− p)P	PIL ))
=−(1− )
2
(
r2

)
Var(P	PIi ) =−
(1− )
2
p(1− p)(P)2(P
)2
(
r2

)
¡ 0:
Summing both eEects yields Proposition 3.
References
Alesina, A., Gatti, R., 1995. Independent central banks: Low in1ation at no cost? American Economic Review
85 (2), 196–200.
E. Gabillon, D. Martimort / European Economic Review 48 (2004) 353–378 377
Barro, R., Gordon, D., 1983. A positive theory of monetary policy in a natural rate model. Journal of
Political Economy 31, 589–610.
Beck, N., 1987. Elections and the fed: Is there a political monetary cycle. American Journal of Political
Science 31, 194–216.
Blinder, A., 1999. Central Banking in Theory and Practice. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Cecchetti, S., Ehrmann, M., 2002. Does in1ation targeting increases output volatility? An international
comparison of policymakers’ preferences and outcomes. In: Loayza, N., Schmidt-Hebbel, K. (Eds.),
Monetary Policy: Rules and Transmission Mechanisms. Central Bank of Chile, Santiago.
Cecchetti, S., Flores-Lagunes, A., Krause, S., 2001. Has monetary policy become more eDcient. NBER
Working paper.
Cukierman, A., 1998. Central Bank Strategy, Credibility and Independence. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Cukierman, A., Meltzer, A., 1986. A theory of ambiguity, credibility and in1ation under discretion and
asymmetric information. Econometrica 54, 1099–1128.
Dixit, A., 1998. Equilibrium contracts for the European central banker. Mimeo., Princeton University.
Faure-Grimaud, A., Martimort, D., 2000. Political stabilization by an independent bureaucracy. Mimeo., IDEI
Toulouse.
Faust, J., 1996. Whom can we trust to run the Fed? Theoretical support for the founder’s view. Journal of
Monetary Economics 37, 267–283.
Friedman, M., 1962. Should there be an Independent Monetary Authority? Dollars and De!cit. Prentice-Hall,
Englewood CliEs, NJ, 1968 (reprinted).
Friedman, M., 1972. The case for a monetary rule. Newsweek, December 8.
Froyen, R., Havrilesky, T., Waud, R., 1993. Political and special interest pressures on U.S. monetary policy.
Mimeo., University of North Carolina.
Gar!nkel, M., Glazer, A., 1994. Does electoral uncertainty cause economic 1uctuations. American Economic
Review 84 (2), 169–173.
Grilli, V., Masciandaro, D., Tabellini, G., 1991. Political and monetary institutions and public !nance policies
in the industrial democracies. Economic Policy 13, 342–392.
Havrilesky, T., 1993. The Pressure on Monetary Policy. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Northwell, MA.
Kane, E., 1980. Politics and FED policy-making. Journal of Monetary Economics 6, 199–211.
LaEont, J.J., Tirole, J., 1993. A Theory of Incentives in Regulation and Procurement. MIT Press, Cambridge,
MA.
O’Flaherty, B., 1990. The care and handling of monetary authority. Economics and Politics 2, 25–44.
Peek, J., Rosemgren, E., Tootell, G., 1999. Is bank supervision central to central banking. Quarterly Journal
of Economics 114, 629–653.
Persson, T., Tabellini, G., 1993. Designing institutions for monetary stability. Carnegie-Rochester Conferences
Series on Public Policy 39, 58–94.
Posen, A., 1995. Declarations are not enough: Financial sector sources of central bank independence. In:
Bernanke, B., Rotemberg, J. (Eds.), NBER Macroeconomic Annual. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
RogoE, K., 1985. The optimal degree of commitment to an intermediate monetary target. Quarterly Journal
of Economics 100, 1169–1189.
RogoE, K., 1989. Reputation, coordination and monetary policy. In: R. Barro (Ed.), Modern Business Theory.
Basil Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 236–264.
Svensson, L., 1995. Optimal in1ation targets, conservative central banks and linear in1ation contracts. CEPR
Working Paper No. 1249, CEPR, London.
Tirole, J., 1986. Hierarchies and bureaucracies: On the role of collusion in organizations. Journal of Law,
Economic and Organization 2, 181–214.
Tirole, J., 1992. Collusion and the theory of organizations. In: LaEont, J.J. (Ed.),, Advances in Economic
Theory, Vol. 2. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 151–206.
Toma, M., 1982. In1ationary bias of the federal reserve system. Journal of Monetary Economics 10,
163–190.
Waller, C., 1989. Monetary policy games and central bank politics. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking
21, 422–431.
Waller, C., 1992. A bargaining model of partisan appointments to the central bank. Journal of Monetary
Economics 29, 411–428.
378 E. Gabillon, D. Martimort / European Economic Review 48 (2004) 353–378
Waller, C., Walsh, C., 1996. Central bank independence, economic behavior, and optimal term length.
American Economic Review 86, 1139–1153.
Walsh, C., 1995. Optimal contracts for independent central bankers. American Economic Review 85,
150–167.
Walsh, C., 1998. Monetary Theory and Policy. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Wooley, J., 1984. Monetary Politics: The Federal Reserve and the Politics of Monetary Policy. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.
